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Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice
The mission of the Joan B. Kroc
Institute for Peace & Justice (IPJ)
is to foster peace, cultivate justice
and create a safer world. Through
education, research and peacemaking activities, the IPJ offers
programs that advance scholarship
and practice in conflict resolution
and human rights.
The IPJ, a unit of the University of
San Diego’s Joan B. Kroc School of
Peace Studies, draws on Catholic
social teaching that sees peace as
inseparable from justice and acts to
prevent and resolve conflicts that
threaten local, national and international peace. The IPJ was established in 2000
through a generous gift from the late Joan B. Kroc to the University of San Diego
to create an institute for the study and practice of peace and justice. Programming
began in early 2001 and the building was dedicated in December 2001 with a
conference, “Peacemaking with Justice: Policy for the 21st Century.”
The Institute strives, in Joan B. Kroc’s words, to “not only talk about peace,
but to make peace.” In its peacebuilding initiatives, the IPJ works with local
partners to help strengthen their efforts to consolidate peace with justice in
the communities in which they live. In Nepal, for example, the IPJ recently
began its eighth year of work with Nepali groups to support inclusiveness
and dialogue in the transition from armed conflict and monarchy to peace
and multiparty democracy. In West Africa, the IPJ works with local human
rights groups to strengthen their ability to pressure government for much
needed reform and accountability.
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The Women PeaceMakers Program documents the stories and best practices
of international women leaders who are involved in human rights and
peacemaking efforts in their home countries. WorldLink, a year-round
educational program for high school students from San Diego and Baja
California, connects youth to global affairs.
Community outreach includes speakers, films, art and opportunities for
discussion between community members, academics and practitioners on issues
of peace and social justice, as well as dialogue with national and international
leaders in government, nongovernmental organizations and the military.
In addition to the Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice, the Joan B. Kroc
School of Peace Studies includes the Trans-Border Institute, which promotes
border-related scholarship and an active role for the university in the crossborder community, and a master’s program in Peace and Justice Studies to
train future leaders in the field.
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Joan B. Kroc Distinguished Lecture Series
Endowed in 2003 by a generous gift to the Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace
& Justice from the late Joan Kroc, the Distinguished Lecture Series is a forum
for high-level national and international leaders and policymakers to share
their knowledge and perspectives on issues related to peace and justice. The
goal of the series is to deepen understanding of how to prevent and resolve
conflict and promote peace with justice.
The Distinguished Lecture Series offers the community at large an opportunity
to engage with leaders who are working to forge new dialogues with parties
in conflict and who seek to answer the question of how to create an enduring
peace for tomorrow. The series, which is held at the Joan B. Kroc Institute
for Peace & Justice at the University of San Diego’s Joan B. Kroc School of
Peace Studies, examines new developments in the search for effective tools
to prevent and resolve conflict while protecting human rights and ensuring
social justice.
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May 8, 2003
Helen Caldicott
	President, Nuclear Policy Research Institute
The New Nuclear Danger				
October 15, 2003	Richard J. Goldstone
	Justice of the Constitutional Court of South Africa
The Role of International Law in Preventing Deadly Conflict
January 14, 2004	Ambassador Donald K. Steinberg
	U.S. Department of State
Conflict, Gender and Human Rights: Lessons Learned 		
from the Field
April 14, 2004
General Anthony C. Zinni
	United States Marine Corps (retired)
From the Battlefield to the Negotiating Table:
Preventing Deadly Conflict
November 4, 2004

Hanan Ashrawi
Secretary General – Palestinian Initiative for the 			
	Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy
Concept, Context and Process in Peacemaking:
The Palestinian-Israeli Experience
November 17, 2004	Noeleen Heyzer
	Executive Director – U.N. Development Fund for Women		
Women, War and Peace: Mobilizing for Security
and Justice in the 21st Century
February 10, 2005	The Honorable Lloyd Axworthy
	President, University of Winnipeg
The Responsibility to Protect: Prescription for a Global 		
Public Domain
March 31, 2005

Mary Robinson
Former President of Ireland and U.N. High
	Commissioner for Human Rights
Human Rights and Ethical Globalization
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October 27, 2005

His Excellency Ketumile Masire
Former President of the Republic of Botswana
Perspectives into the Conflict in the Democratic Republic 		
of the Congo and Contemporary Peacebuilding Efforts

January 27, 2006	Ambassador Christopher R. Hill
	U.S. Department of State
U.S. Policy in East Asia and the Pacific
March 9, 2006
William F. Schulz
	Executive Director – Amnesty International USA
Tainted Legacy: 9/11 and the Ruin of Human Rights
September 7, 2006 Shirin Ebadi
2003 Nobel Peace Laureate
Iran Awakening: Human Rights, Women and Islam
October 18, 2006

Miria Matembe, Alma Viviana Pérez, Irene Santiago
Women, War and Peace: The Politics of Peacebuilding

April 12, 2007	The Honorable Gareth Evans
	President – International Crisis Group
Preventing Mass Atrocities: Making “Never Again”a Reality
September 20, 2007	Kenneth Roth
	Executive Director – Human Rights Watch
The Dynamics of Human Rights and the Environment
March 4, 2008	Jan Egeland
Former Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian
Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator for the U.N.
War, Peace and Climate Change: A Billion Lives in the Balance
April 17, 2008	Jane Goodall
Founder – Jane Goodall Institute and U.N. Messenger of Peace
Reason for Hope
September 24, 2008	The Honorable Louise Arbour
Former U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights
Integrating Security, Development and Human Rights
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BIOGRAPHY OF THE HONORABLE
LOUISE ARBOUR
The Honorable Louise Arbour was the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights from 2004 until June 2008. As high commissioner, Arbour
earned an international reputation for courage and tenacity and gained the
respect of governments, human rights groups and human rights victims
around the world.
Arbour began a distinguished academic career in 1974, culminating in the
position of associate dean at the Osgoode Hall Law School of York University
in Toronto, Canada, in 1987. The same year, she was appointed to the
Supreme Court of Ontario (High Court of Justice) and later served on the
Court of Appeal for Ontario. In 1996, she was appointed by the U.N. Security
Council as chief prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunals for the
former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda. After three years as prosecutor, she was
appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada in 1999.
Arbour has received many awards and medals, including the Medal of Honour
from the International Association of Prosecutors, the Franklin Delano
Roosevelt Four Freedoms Medal (Freedom from Fear) from the Roosevelt
Study Center in the Netherlands, the Lord Reading Law Society’s Human
Rights Award, the EID-UL-ADHA Award from the Association of Progressive
Muslims of Ontario, the National Achievement Award from Jewish Women
International of Canada, and the Order of Canada. She has served on the
board of the International Crisis Group since 2000. Throughout her career
Arbour has sought to liberate both the oppressed and their oppressors by
creating a safe climate for diversity and dissent.
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INTERVIEW
The following is an edited transcript of an interview with Louise Arbour,
conducted on Sept. 24, 2008, by Dustin Sharp, J.D., senior program officer
at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice.

DS: I’d like to interview about a broad range of topics, touching both
upon your personal life and background as well as many things related
to international justice and human rights. To start with, is there
anything in your early experience growing up in Canada that you feel,
looking back, set you on the path to becoming an advocate for justice
and human rights or to becoming a member of the legal profession?
Were there any special figures or experiences that influenced you?
LA: Essentially no, which I hope is encouraging for the numerous young people
I meet who don’t seem to know what to do with their lives; I hope I’m a role
model for them. Certainly in the early part of my education I had no particular
interest in these more specific things I ended up doing later, including becoming
a lawyer. None of that was part of my landscape of interests growing up. Like
a lot of people of my generation I found myself in law school pretty well by
default as I didn’t seem to have any talent for anything that was really hard. Law
school seemed relatively accessible, and the general sense in those days was
with a law degree you could then go into journalism or politics, so I was never
really driven even to the law as a profession.
DS: It was the flexibility.
LA: Yes, it was another continuation of, in my view, a general education and
subject matters that generally interested me, like literature, political science. But
it’s pretty clear that I found my match for intellectual interests in law school.
I liked law school right from the beginning, while a lot of people didn’t. My
generation speaks very badly of their law school years, found it very boring. I
liked everything about it. I liked the very mechanical stuff, like inheritance rules
and so on. I find that intriguing. But obviously the fit for me was the combination
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of (if you want to see it there) high moral content and an organizational structure
to advance values. I liked everything about the law. I liked all public law issues.
I liked constitutional law, but criminal law in particular.
There was sort of a defining moment, as is often the case. After my three
years of law school in Quebec, in Canada we do articling to qualify for the
bar. During that year, the federal government enacted the War Measures Act,
essentially putting the country in a state of emergency, suspending all civil
liberties in the face of what was called then – wrongly in retrospect – an
apprehended insurrection at the hands of separatist terrorists in Quebec. This
was an immense political awakening for me to see essentially the fragility
of democratic institutions. This was a big liberal democracy, Canada, with a
long history of it, and all of a sudden overnight – I lived in Montreal – the
army had taken over all the police stations. The streets of the city of Montreal
all were under military occupation, so it seemed. It was very troublesome.
From then on I developed a clear commitment to using the law to develop a
web of protection for people, but also as the main tool for the prevention of
the abuse of power. I became active in the Canadian Civil Liberties Association.
So that political moment for me in retrospect was pretty defining.
DS: As a student and as a young law professor, would you say your
focus was more on domestic civil liberties, protections, than it was
international human rights per se?
LA: Yes. I went to law school from 1967 to 1970, and this was probably the
peak of the very aggressive discourse of nationalistic aspirations by French
Canadians. In fact, it’s after that that I went for the first time to the rest of
Canada, to English Canada, which culturally was very foreign. When that
happened a few years later I was just amazed at the political issues that
people were discussing in English Canada, like the Vietnam War, poverty,
gender equality. During my years in law school in Quebec, the oxygen was
entirely taken by the question of Quebec nationalism. It was not the sole
issue – we had debates about abortion, and of course we were conscious
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and we had positions and views on the Vietnam War – but in proportion, the
question of the proper place of French-speaking Canadians and Quebecois
exercising their right to self-determination vastly dominated all other issues.
We were consumed by that, which then became very interesting for me when
I worked as the prosecutor, particularly in the former Yugoslavia where
nationalism had been a pathology. Where I came from, nationalism was for the
most part a very romantic, positive aspiration – there was nothing wrong with
it. It was a very legitimate, very romantic set of aspirations that were advanced
in Quebec mostly by poets and filmmakers and writers and intellectuals –
and by a lot of ordinary people who wanted space to live their lives within
their own culture. So it was very shocking to me to see the underbelly of
nationalism and to see it having essentially turned into not the ideology of
inclusion, but the ideology of exclusion – to the point of genocide.
DS: I think within the larger human rights community it’s not unusual
to find people who were drawn to it by their experience as a racial or
religious or cultural minority in the countries in which they’ve grown
up. To what extent did your experience growing up as a French Canadian
help draw you into human rights at a later point, or at least spark your
interest in civil liberties and the boundaries of state power?
LA: Depending on your perspective, you’re often a minority and a majority.
French-speaking Quebecois are a minority inside Canada, but a very large
majority inside Quebec. So, if you’re intellectually honest, you have to be
very conscious of that, of how assertive you need to be as a member of the
minority vis a vis carving a space – cultural, economic, political space for
yourself – amongst the majority, but also how you can very easily in doing so
become the oppressor of minorities – for instance, in Quebec, of aboriginal
peoples, or if you’re not looking just in terms of cultural minorities, of poor
people, people with disabilities, other sub-groups of your own community
who are in a minority position. So, maybe it does provide, if you’re willing to
address these issues, an insight into the advancement of rights.
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DS: Over the course of your career you’ve played an extraordinary
number of roles and also a diversity of roles, going from law
professor to judge, human rights investigator, chief prosecutor for the
International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
and Rwanda (ICTR), high commissioner for human rights. It’s many
people’s experience that if you spend a long enough time in a certain
career, there’s a certain professional sensibility and worldview that’s
shaped. At some level, do you still see yourself as a professor or judge?
Do you identify with any of those roles? Do you see these in some
ways as roles that you’ve played on the stage or costumes that you’ve
had to wear, and your identity lies in some other place behind that?
LA: Well, as a matter of fact, in at least one of these roles I had to wear a
costume – on the bench – so the metaphor is not at all inappropriate. I have
to say that when this is all over (and it’s not all over; I hope I still find myself
gainfully employed if I could just make up my mind about what to do with
my future), I think of myself as a jurist. I suppose I could say a lawyer, but
I am a person of the law. I won’t think of myself perennially as a judge,
though I’ve done that for a large part of my career. I was also an academic
for a considerable part of it. Then I was an international civil servant in my
two international roles, but they were very different – that of prosecutor and
that of high commissioner.
But the one common thread through all of this is I come to all these positions
very much as a person of the law, as a jurist. I believe in the law. It’s the
field in which I have expertise in which I’m very self-reliant; I trust my own
judgment and analysis of the law. And the rest of it I think I was an accidental
tourist on the more political scene, for instance internationally. And I’ve
learned I think I’m probably better at it than I was when I first entered all
that in understanding the complexities, say, of the United Nations. But the
common thread is absolutely, clearly for me the necessity to use the rule of
law as an organizing principle of international and domestic affairs.
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I am probably less an advocate than anything else because the one thing I’ve
never really done is be a courtroom lawyer. I know a lot about techniques of
advocacy, certainly courtroom advocacy, viewing it from the bench, and I’ve
participated in lots of these things, but one thing I haven’t done myself is the
kind of advocacy that now I’m freer to do than I’ve ever been really in my life.
DS: I also wanted to talk about the relationship between career, gender
and family issues. In the context of the current U.S. presidential election,
questions have been raised in some quarters about the ability of Sarah Palin,
the nominee for vice president on the Republican ticket, to serve as vice
president of this country given that she has five children, including one child
with special needs. Of course, many people have pointed out that the same
question would never be asked of a male candidate, and I know you have
three children, and grandchildren as well. In your career, have you had to
face this double standard as well as other double standards along the way?
LA: I have made choices, professional choices, that always took into consideration
all my circumstances including the fact that I have three children and I was their
mother in this world. Whether cultural constraints and so on still impose gender
roles that are different for men and women, if you look at it globally I think
overwhelming it is true. And yet I have many friends who are women lawyers
who’ve had husbands whose careers have given them more leeway to be at
home. I think there is a growing change in the otherwise stereotypical model of
the North American family unit. But it’s changing very slowly.
My daughter is now in her career where I was when she was born, a 31-year-old
lawyer, expecting a second child, and frankly, sometimes I think, God we’ve made
no progress. She faces exactly the issues I was facing about childcare and what
kind of arrangements can be put in place. We’ve progressed a little bit; I think the
maternity-leave support and so on is more advanced and better developed.
But essentially I would never lecture another woman about how to run her
life and manage her family circumstances. I think it depends first of all on the
partnership with her spouse, of the role she wants to play in the upbringing
of her children. There were things I deliberately decided not to pursue, and
16

in part maybe that’s why I never went into private practice when my children
were quite small. Even though I always worked, my being available to them
was very important to me when they were quite young. Basically the jobs I’ve
done a little later in my career I could not have done when my children were
little – one, because I didn’t have the experience obviously, but also because
my family circumstances would not have permitted it.
DS: I want to shift gears and now talk about issues of international
justice and international judicial policy, international tribunals and
prosecutions. From 1996 to 1999 you served as chief prosecutor for
the ICTR and ICTY, and as you’ve said publicly before, these tribunals
are part of the legacy of Nuremberg and in turn they’re going to leave
their own legacy. Of course, no initiative is perfect – you might say
little by little we’re conducting experiments in international justice,
hoping that each one is better than what came before it. What are the
lessons of the ICTY and ICTR? What do they represent in terms of
achievements? But also, what would we change if we could go back,
knowing what we know now?
LA: I think the biggest achievement of the two ad hoc tribunals, taken
together, is that they were sufficiently successful to lead to the creation of
the International Criminal Court (ICC). It was not obvious when they started
whether this would not be a one-shot affair, what would be the lesson learned.
There are lots of shortcomings. I think if we had to do it again, I would like
to think we would have found a formula that would be less costly, more
efficient – but as they say, it’s like dogs dancing: Sometimes it’s a miracle
they’re dancing at all, so you don’t watch the steps too closely.
There is something absolutely miraculous about the fact that these tribunals
have hit their stride and led to the creation of the International Criminal Court.
When I say it’s miraculous, it’s because there were obviously strong political
winds blowing constantly against the expansion of the idea of accountability.
In a sense it was done very rapidly. There are lots of structural flaws. If you’re
interested in criminal law for instance, it’s very clear to me in retrospect
that we copied basically domestic models of criminal law enforcement and
17

transposed that to the international community, but the environment is
completely different. And the ICC has not fixed that.
I think in the longer term we’ll have to move to a criminal law model that
is very indigenous to working in the international forum, which means all
the obvious – we don’t have our own police force – but it also means that
in a lot of cases there is a state working against you. If you indict a head
of state or a high-ranking military officer, it’s possible – not in every case,
but it’s possible – that his government will have an interest in getting him
acquitted and will work very systematically in that direction. The rules are
premised on the fact that it’s the prosecutor who has all the state’s powers,
so to restore the balance you have to put constraints on the prosecutor and
give advantages to the accused, like the presumption of innocence and the
right to be tried in a reasonable time and the right to counsel and all kinds
of rights. You put constraints on the methods available to the prosecutor. In
these environments very often the situation is completely reversed: The state
is on the other side. So we still have conceptually some work to do. But the
biggest success is that we got there.
As one example, even though they might not have been completely dismantled,
when I arrived in 1996 as prosecutor, there was a credible possibility that the
tribunals would adopt trials in absentia because the judges in particular were
so frustrated at the limited prospect of arrests of indicted war criminals. Now,
to me, this would have been a catastrophic setback because it would have
become very addictive and the tribunals would have basically become courts
of archives. If there was an alternative to arrest, the little political will there
was to perform these arrests would have completely dissipated. So the fact
that we actually managed to make these tribunals work as real courts where,
hard as it was, all the parts eventually fell into place, from investigation to
arrest to trial to conviction to incarceration, is nothing short of miraculous.
DS: Some people have criticized the tribunals in particular by saying
that they weren’t anchored in the communities which they were most
intended to serve. What do you think of this criticism? To some extent,
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one can ask the question whether it’s possible to do international justice
or international tribunals in a way that avoids this, given that the
international community only intervenes when the national systems
have already failed, so there is some disconnect between tribunals and
the victims to begin with. Do you think something like the Special
Court for Sierra Leone, a more hybrid model, has hit the mark, even
though it obviously has its own shortcomings?
LA: Certainly in the common law tradition, the fundamental concept of the
jury system is that justice has to be local and as local as possible. A change
of venue is already an extraordinary measure that can be employed only
when a fair trial is otherwise at risk. So the idea that justice is very local and
has to be owned by the injured community is very strong. I think we have to
ask ourselves whether this is desirable in the international forum, and if it is
desirable, then we should do everything we can to accommodate, recognizing
that in some cases it will not be immediately possible. If we take Rwanda, for
instance, if we believe that this local aspect to international justice is critical,
the question is, how soon could you hold a trial in Kigali?
I think first we have to ask ourselves fundamental questions: Are we again just
transposing a domestic model onto the international model? When a crime is
“against humanity,” who is the injured community? Where is the appropriate
venue for the trial? I think it’s worth thinking about because if it’s too local, it
loses in part the deterrent effect, but most importantly, the denunciation effect
of an international voice. If you take the Special Court for Sierra Leone, you
might say – it’ll be interesting to see if this can be measured – it would have
greater impact domestically because it was closer to the ground so to speak, but
maybe a lot less impact internationally in telling the Sierra Leone story to the
world and, in that way, rallying the international community in its denunciation
of what happened, serving as a deterrent model. I think it cuts both ways.
Maybe this will all become irrelevant as we move into an era when geography
is a lot less relevant with the kind of information technology we have.
I think the key though as we refine these models is constantly to ask ourselves,
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what is the guiding principle, what is the desirable objective? And then do
everything we can to foster that objective, as opposed to conceding without
much thought whether we could get much closer to the ground. With ICTY,
for instance, it might have been true at the beginning, maybe less true later
in the process.
DS: Do you think the ICC obviates the need for ICTRs and ICTYs?
Are these the last ad hoc tribunals we’re going to see? Also, you
mentioned the issue of cost. It’s often been said that war and human
rights violations are much more costly than justice will ever be, but
politically the issue of cost in the United Nations is very problematic.
Will the combination of the ICC and the cost of the ICTR and ICTY
mean that they will be the last of their kind?
LA: I think it’s very difficult to imagine that the Security Council would set up
another ad hoc tribunal, particularly now that it has created the precedent of
sending a referral to the ICC in the case of the Sudan. Now that the Security
Council has used its referral power, it would be hard to imagine on what kind
of rationale it would choose not to refer a case to the ICC and call on all the
expenditures for setting up a fully parallel process.
It doesn’t mean that the Security Council’s role in activating accountability is over
– quite the opposite. I think that, in a sense surprisingly but happily, they did
exercise that jurisdiction in the case of Sudan. But it seems to me that that sends
a signal that this is the route to go in the future, and we’re unlikely to see totally
self-standing international ad hoc initiatives like the first two. We’ll probably see
a lot more hybrid-type models and probably see also a branching out, as we’re
seeing in the case of Lebanon, outside the traditional war crimes tribunals.
There’s a danger there I think. We have to think pretty seriously about
whether the United Nations wants to be in the supplemental criminal justice
business, but unattached necessarily to war crimes or crimes against humanity
in some cases where there may be a lot of political difficulties in just using

20

the national systems. After Lebanon, the same issue percolated in the case of
the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, for instance. Here’s a sovereign country
that has a lot of capacity for investigations and prosecutions, but where
there could be political suspicions. So, will the United Nations be drawn into
criminal justice enforcement outside the war crimes models? I think the jury’s
still out on these kinds of issues.
As for cost, you are entirely correct. It will continue to be so that a year in the
life of a tribunal or the ICC is cheaper than a day of peacekeeping operations.
At the end of the day, it’s not how much money it costs in the abstract or in
comparison to war or in comparison to a day in the budget of MONUC in the
DRC.1 The question is and will always remain: If that was all the international
community was prepared to put into post-conflict reconstruction, was it
money well-spent to put it all into the trial of 12 or 50 people, say in the
case of Rwanda? Who should have the right to answer that question? Is it
the victims, the people of Rwanda? Would they have said, “Well, if you had
told us you would be spending a billion dollars in this exercise, we would
have said no thank you, just write the check and we’ll do something else
with it”? But that’s not the way I think that one can realistically look at it.
DS: When we talk about the future of tribunals, the future of the
ICC, but more globally the future of international accountability
mechanisms and international justice, one of the big questions out there
– and it’s argued different ways by different sides – is the question of
politicization. Concerns are typically raised on at least two levels, the
first being that given limited resources and the amount of time it takes
to prosecute someone, only the biggest fish are going to be prosecuted,
which inevitably raises questions about individual selectivity.
And the second issue: African governments often maintain that they
are disproportionately targeted by international justice mechanisms.
They say that when you look around the world, Africans are brought
to book while abusers from the U.S., Russia and Israel are left to
						
1 United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
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carry on. This is particularly raised in the context of the ICC where
all the indictments and prosecutions thus far have been Africans. I’m
wondering what you think of this issue generally.
I’d also like to ask you, as a former prosecutor who did have to operate
with limited resources, how did you go about choosing whom to
indict? Was it solely a legal determination, or do political policy and
pragmatic concerns inevitably slip into the mix?
LA: I think on this question of politicization of the role of the prosecutor and
this whole package, first we have to understand what we mean by political
considerations. If we mean, at one extreme, would the prosecutor seek the
consent or the approval of a permanent member of the Security Council before
taking a certain initiative or would they attempt to intervene – then that kind
of blatant, purely political interference is completely inappropriate.
In a domestic context, the general assumption is that all crimes detected
are prosecuted unless there’s a kind of de minimis rule – that they’re so
minor they can be ignored or disposed of by some form of minor dispute
resolution. Universal prosecution is the norm. The minute you work in an
environment internationally, that’s clearly not the case; nobody claims that
every person implicated in the genocide in Rwanda will be prosecuted
before an international court. It invites the exercise of discretion, which is
not the same thing as political consideration. It’s political in the juridical
sense, based on the policies.
It seems to me that what we need is a more explicit framework developed
by the prosecutor to guide the exercise of his or her discretion, so that it
would be transparently visible why certain things are done and not others,
why certain countries and not others. I think what is problematic is that,
assuming there is a guiding policy, it’s not disclosed and it’s not discernible,
so it looks very capricious. Discretion is not the same thing as arbitrariness.
It seems to me that in some cases, the pursuit of opportunity is not in and of
itself reprehensible. Everything else being equal, if you have an opportunity
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to arrest someone who is a high-ranking suspect, and next to that you have
a file where you conduct a two-year investigation but you don’t even know
if the suspect is still alive, this could be a consideration. The likelihood of
apprehension is one of the many factors you want to look for.
The key is for prosecutors to circumscribe their own discretion by articulating
the parameters within which they will exercise it, and the rest you do on a
case-by-case basis. It’s the same for judges; that’s the framework. Lots of
decisions made by judges are discretionary. It doesn’t mean they are capricious
or unguided by experience or precedent or “political,” but it means you are
not bound to do one or the other. And I think that it’s important when we
embark on that discussion to be very clear about that.
DS: But supposing for example that one were to look at the African
cases before the ICC and one determined that in each individual
instance they were made on the basis of the best principle, the most
neutral insight available, even so, to what extent do you think that if
this pattern were to continue of targeting almost exclusively African
cases, the ICC is risking some of its long-term credibility as a young
international institution?
LA: Then it would assume that there is something wrong with this so-called
targeting of principally or exclusively African countries. This begs several
questions. The first one is, have they ratified the ICC, the Rome Statute, as
opposed to others? It’d be very nice to go somewhere else, but if they haven’t
ratified and the case is not raised to the Security Council for a referral, having
no jurisdiction is a really good reason not to be somewhere. I think before
being too quick to say, well, these are all African cases, you have to look at
who has ratified the treaty, where is the jurisdiction to start with.
The second thing is, the prosecutor has to look very early on at the question
of complementarity and admissibility of cases. Again, I think it’s not an
exaggeration to say that if there were hypothetically credible reasons to
believe that war crimes may have been committed in different countries,
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you may want to ask yourself, what is the likelihood that a credible national
investigation will be conducted? And again, it’s not surprising – when they
enacted the Rome Statute it should have been perfectly apparent that the
ICC would essentially be a default jurisdiction for countries that did not have
adequate legal systems and law enforcement and judicial systems in place to
conduct in a credible manner complex and high-stake prosecutions.
So, for a part of our history, if we continue to invest in other areas but not
in this one – and I hope we will invest much more than we are now in the
development of law enforcement and judicial capacity in African countries
– there’s no question the ICC will be the default jurisdiction. And this will
be correct in law, even though it may be denounced for political reasons as
incorrect. So, again, I think we have to look pretty carefully at the reality.
But it is the case that the bulk of the ICC’s work, if not the totality of its
work, comes from Africa. Again, you can have two reactions. You can try to
change the appearances by running around trying to find cases elsewhere
for the sake of addressing this alleged shortcoming – which in my view is a
political decision, and I’m not sure the right one. Or you can acknowledge
that reality and engage with Africa, be very explicit about the fact that that
appears to be the case. To my mind the question would be, shouldn’t the ICC
then maybe talk to the African Union about having an African presence much
more systematized, maybe holding some of the trials on the continent and
so on? Sometimes you can transform liability into something more positive,
rather than concede that it’s a liability and try to fight it.
DS: When you were chief prosecutor, many of your efforts were
directed at looking how high up the chain of command responsibility
could legally be attributed. In the wake of rights abuses that have been
committed by U.S. soldiers in the context of the U.S. war on terror
and in Iraq and elsewhere, it seems that responsibility, at least legal
responsibility, has often stopped at a relatively low level. Often when
we talk about impunity for human rights abuses, we associate this
word with poor and war-torn countries, but of course some argue that
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that term does have applicability in the context of the U.S. war on
terror, particularly as it relates to torture, extraordinary rendition
and other abuses that have been committed. How do you assess the
human rights legacy of the U.S. war on terror several years on and
what it’s done to the ability of the U.S. to act as a good-faith promoter
of human rights around the world?
LA: That’s a very difficult issue. We always put “war on terror” in quotation
marks, as though intuitively the many who are forced to use that expression
want to question all the baggage that is contained in that because it seems
to call for the application of the laws of war. And when they’re not very
convenient, then the war on terror is seen as a metaphor, so it’s really the war
in Iraq and the war in Afghanistan. But secret detention centers, assuming
some existed in some European countries, would be part of the “war on terror”
but not a real war. So, I think there’s a tremendous obscurantisme around
the use of that expression, not unlike the “war on drugs” as a worldwide net
that covers everything from very targeted operational activities to ideological
positions, for instance about syringe exchanges and needle exchanges and so
on. I think the war on terror carries a lot of that ambiguity when it comes to
the application of the law and which laws and to whom and by whom.
Now, again, to the extent that the United States has not ratified the Rome treaty,
its eventual exposure if it were a party to the Rome treaty would depend on
the quality or an assessment of its genuine ability and willingness to conduct
its own investigations. There again, it seems to me it would be in the interests
of the U.S. to be very forthcoming about exercising to the fullest its national
capacity – which is the best bar against any external scrutiny – through the
principles of double jeopardy, but even within their own statutes.
It’s sometimes difficult to understand why there’s continued resistance to
much more public, much more transparent investigations and accounting for
apparent misbehaving, either in the use of torture or, as is currently the case
in Afghanistan, with the very surprising and continued high number of civilian
casualties, which then lead to investigations that are never made public and
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never seem to find anything, not even the smallest amount of negligence, and
yet with undertakings that it won’t happen again – which is not very credible
when you cannot explain what happened in the first place.
DS: Very soon in this country we’re going to have a new president and
a new administration. What are two or three things for the incoming
administration to do not only to rectify some of the problems and the
excesses of the war on terror, but also to regain some of that moral
standing that at points in our history we’ve enjoyed?
LA: I think the growth of what has been called American exceptionalism is
a very serious liability for the kind of human rights and political advocacy
that the U.S. wants to do elsewhere. It’s an untenable position to say you
should be doing A, B, C or D, but we are not going to hold ourselves
to these standards or at least we refuse to be scrutinized for that; tyrants
should be brought to account, but we don’t have any tyrants and if we do,
we’ll do it ourselves, so we don’t ratify or don’t join in any international
consensus; we’re great champions of human rights but we don’t ratify any
international instruments – but you should, it’ll be good for you. These are
constantly called double standards and they become a serious liability for the
advancement, the championing of human rights by the U.S. In some cases
they are clearly double standards, in a lot of cases they are not, but because
they are credible in some cases, they taint just about every American initiative
in these domains.
I think the first thing the U.S. would want to do is bring itself into the fold: take
a seat on the Human Rights Council, ratify international instruments, send a lot
of signals that it’s now a player and that it’s engaged and advocating for the
importance of the rule of law. For the rest of the world, the entire Guantánamo
exercise, secret detentions and so on were a blatant effort by the executive to
bypass judicial review, which is a hallmark of American democracy.
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The United States has three branches of governance and the efforts by one
to completely marginalize the other – that is, the executive trying to bypass
completely the oversight of the courts – sends by action a signal entirely
contrary to the message that the U.S. is sending about the spread of democracy.
So then, the real message is that you should have democracy reduced to
pretty gross electoral machinery: You should elect people in elections that
are sort of free and fair in the sense that there were not massive frauds at the
ballot box, and then that’s enough – you have a working democracy.
This is a vision of democracy that is not what Americans believe in. Democracy
requires a whole set of institutions of checks and balances, free media, civil
society organizations, courts that work, a real balance between legislative
and executive power. So again, the Guantánamo message, quite apart from
the sheer brutality of state action, sends a signal that when we talk about the
rule of law, we don’t really mean it – given the opportunity we will bypass
even our sophisticated control mechanisms. So at every level I think these
activities have been very costly for the advancement of human rights and
democratic values.
DS: In the course of these last seven years, the U.S. administration
has had a lot of high-profile clashes in the Security Council and with
the United Nations. You’ve just stepped down from your post as high
commissioner, so I wanted to talk with you about the Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the U.N. human rights
system. What was the high point of your time as high commissioner, and
what were two or three of your biggest frustrations or disappointments
working within that system during your time there?
LA: The high point was probably what happened to us during the secretarygeneral’s reform initiative, what eventually led to the outcome document of
the World Summit in 2005 – this was Kofi Annan’s very ambitious reform
agenda. He failed in his attempt at reforming the Security Council, but as
part of this exercise we were mandated to develop a plan of action for the
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Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and through all these
initiatives, we rapidly presented a plan of action that in my view had a very
explicit vision. It was very frank about how we wanted to be involved in
implementation of rights, not just further normative exercises. To be more
specific, we requested as part of that a commitment by the General Assembly
for the doubling of our share of the regular budget of the United Nations
within five years. It was a monumental achievement that we managed to get
that commitment in the outcome document of the reform exercise.
It was also part of reforming the Commission on Human Rights into a Human
Rights Council; there were lots of other things. But for OHCHR itself, basically
it has meant that after my four years as high commissioner, I left the office with
twice the size it was when I came in, twice as much money, we grew to twice
as many staff members, and therefore had the capacity to work in the field.
This was transforming. It was on an order of magnitude that went beyond just
regular budgetary increases; it actually transformed an organization that was
otherwise devoted almost exclusively to servicing member states, servicing
the Human Rights Council, servicing the treaty body system, and all of a
sudden through this influx, OHCHR was able – in addition to these tasks –
to develop its own agenda of promoting and protecting human rights in the
field. So, this was I think pretty fundamental.
DS: And frustrations and disappointments?
LA: Some of them are very technical and they would not be of general
public interest, but for me they were very real. One of them is my failure at
attempting a parallel reform of the treaty body system. It’s very obscure, it’s
a system that’s not very well-known, it may not mean much for a general
audience. I think in retrospect the kind of appetite for reform in the United
Nations had dwindled. By the time they managed to get enough energy to
abolish the Commission on Human Rights and create the council, to take
on a major institutional reform of the treaty body system was just too much
at that time. But I remain persuaded that as a monitoring body it’s archaic,
it’s invisible, and as a result of that, it has very little authority, it’s not well-
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known, it’s not easily accessed, it’s owned in a sense by a very small circle
of experts. I think it has the capacity to be a lot more than that. And I was
completely unsuccessful. Member states I think were very wary that this
eventually, over the horizon, was a plot on my part to create a court.
On a day-to-day basis, what’s frustrating for the human rights high
commissioner, probably more than for any other U.N. official – but for all U.N.
officials to one degree or another – is that at the end of the day, you cannot
make states do what they should do but don’t want to do. The barrier of state
sovereignty in the human rights field is pretty catastrophic, but I’m sure the
high commissioner for refugees feels the same way on a day-to-day basis. The
under-secretary-general for humanitarian affairs I’m sure is at times hugely
frustrated at his inability to deploy. But in human rights, it’s endemic.
DS: It seems like so many human rights blockages do just boil down to
a question of political will, which is of course hard to generate as an
international civil servant.
LA: Yes, that’s right. But that’s why, because at this stage there’s so much to
do, you have to make a pretty cool-headed assessment of opportunities and
temporarily lost causes, and deploy when there is a chance for action. Of
course you get heavily criticized for being here but not there, but at the end
of the day you have to work with what’s available. And some things are just
not available.
DS: When we talk about the Human Rights Commission and the
Human Rights Council, is there a distinction? Is there a difference
and are there new possibilities for an effective institution that didn’t
exist before?
LA: I think there is, structurally, good news, but no, we cannot underestimate
the fact that the morning after the commission was abolished and the council
was created, it was the same men and women occupying the same chairs in
the same room. Until you have a healthy rotation, both of states, members of
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the council, office holders, the various ambassadors who are there – people
come and go and it makes a huge difference – I think it will take time before
the Human Rights Council develops its own footprint. Let’s put it this way:
It’s more like the former commission than unlike.
It does have a few features that carry at least the possibility of a pretty
dramatic change. The Universal Periodic Review, even if in and of itself it
doesn’t do miracles in portraying the deficiencies of each individual state, is
a fundamental transformation in the culture of individual state scrutiny – and
that has been the albatross of the commission. The commission failed because
it could not reinvent itself into a body that could try to be an implementer of
norms. It was very good at articulating and developing norms, but the minute
it started having country rapporteurs and fingering individual countries, it
totally collapsed. The council has that capacity, in part through the Universal
Periodic Review, of getting states to come and sit at the table and put a
spotlight on at least their grossest, most obvious human rights shortcomings
in a public environment. This I think will payoff, that in the long run it will
be business as usual to look at what countries do on the ground. But it will
take time before that becomes part of the culture of the council.
DS: One of the successes of the human rights movement over the last
50 years is that all states now feel at least some obligation to defend
their human rights records and speak in the vocabulary of human
rights. At the same time, part and parcel with that, we see states
becoming more adept at using the language and vocabulary of rights,
seeing through the passage of legal instruments designed to ensure
we strive for human rights, but we see there is very little change on
the ground in terms of abuses that are taking place. What can the
international community and NGOs do that’s not already being done
to call people to account for this duplicity: states cloaking themselves
in the language of human rights, the language of democracy, but of
course the practice is often anything but?
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LA: I think the one thing that we have done smartly is create these kind
of irreversible institutions that force states in the right direction – a lot of
them yelling and screaming about all these mechanisms of personal criminal
accountability. In a sense it’s a miracle that the tribunals were formed and
then the ICC was in place, but now that it’s in place, its tools can be used to
advance human rights compliance in a small way in that environment. I think
we have to continue, as the norms are well in place to develop the institutions.
I think we need to advocate for human rights regional institutions, in Asia for
instance where it’s very absent, because after that’s in place – with a little bit
of luck, led by people with a spine – it can actually start producing results.
I think we have to face head-on the current climate of disrespect for the
human rights discourse that comes from this perception of double standards,
politicization, human rights being essentially the vehicle of the promotion
of Western interests. That becomes very facile but very popular language in
developing countries. It has a lot of resonance. It plays on national pride,
suspicion of Western intentions. So I think this is absolutely critical. And
that’s why I tell my friends in the European countries, until some of you start
ratifying the Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers, you can’t credibly
lecture others about their shortcomings. Can’t you see how not credible it is?
And frankly, the Durban review conference I think is another albatross, another
minefield that can be very easily manipulated to derail all the important
human rights efforts by essentially hijacking the agenda and the rhetoric and
re-characterizing things in a very negative way. I think on all these issues,
when the Western countries express enormous skepticism about the Durban
review process and the danger that it could be transformed into an anti-Semitic
rally and so on – it’s true, it’s not an illegitimate concern, there’s historical
precedent to express that concern – the danger is that to others it looks like a
very convenient pretext for the Western world not to look at the one human
rights issue in which they are profoundly deficient, which is racism and which
matters a lot to the rest of the world. In a sense it fosters the cynicism that
funny enough, when you talk about issues where their shortcomings are very
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obvious – migration, racism – the Western world all of a sudden finds all kinds
of good reasons not to be a player or not to be engaged.
I think the burden is on the Western countries. It’s easy to say that they’ve already
done enough, they are the good guys to start with – that’s not enough because
they have more capacity. And if they’re serious about the promotion of the entire
agenda, they’re going to have to do a lot of the tough things themselves.
DS: You have also talked about the benefit that increased recognition
by the Western powers of economic, social and cultural rights could
have for the advancement of human rights in general. We often repeat
homilies about the indivisibility and interdependence of all rights, but
of course in practice there has been a marginalization of economic,
social and cultural rights and a privileging of civil and political rights.
You’ve also noted in the past that when you consider the links between
security, human rights and development, drawing those distinctions
between the two treaties just simply doesn’t make sense anymore. Do
you think the emerging paradigm of human security is something
that would allow us to move out of this legacy of categorization of
rights into two large camps?
LA: This is in part something that I will address in my talk tonight, not
with a lot of answers, but at least highlighting again these difficulties. I
think it’s no better expressed than in the field of gender equality. If you
look at the position of women worldwide who are to varying degrees in
positions of inequality virtually everywhere, even in very advanced liberal
democracies in which their participation in public life is increasing they still
have a disproportionate share of poverty and ill health and so on. If you
look at that, it seems to me that the impact of economic and social rights on
gender inequality is dramatically more severe than the impact of violations
of civil and political rights.
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I think it’s important to use maybe the timing of the 60th anniversary of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) to try to reintegrate these
efforts again, for a lot of reasons. First, I think the advancement of economic
and social rights in any country would be a good thing on their own merits,
but furthermore, this will also go to addressing directly this question of
double standards, hypocrisy and the pursuit of a purely culturally Westerndriven vision of human rights.
It will also have the advantage of, if the West were to seriously engage in
these issues, calling the bluff of the developing world. Either they’re serious
that they’re interested in social and economic rights or it’s just a pretext
for doing nothing, so why not really engage there? But it’s very contrary to
the Western economic market model. It may be that the rattling of the U.S.
financial markets, the pretty severe tsunami that seems to be hitting them,
will posit that proposition in terms that will be more accessible to discussions
in the United States.
DS: I want to talk about an issue that isn’t always thought of as a
classical human rights problem in the traditional sense. It’s the
question of corruption. Many manuscripts have been starting to try
to make the case that, for example, rampant corruption can result in
denial of rights to health and education on the social and economic
rights front. Looking at civil and political rights, if we look at West
Africa for example, we’ve seen that many of the issues that gave rise
to the phenomenally brutal conflicts that took place in Liberia and
Sierra Leone rest squarely in the area of governance, and here we’re
talking about mismanagement and corruption. Do you see corruption
as being within the mandate of OHCHR, that it’s sufficiently bound up
with violations of both civil and political, and economic, social and
cultural rights that we could start to address it as a traditional human
rights issue? What can the U.N. system be doing that’s not already
being done to address the question?
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LA: I have to say that the few times when it bubbled up during my tenure, I
was not very keen to embrace it. I felt even by the time I left the Office of the
High Commissioner, we could barely deal with the pretty classic human rights
issues. In some we had almost walked away because of lack of resources
and capacity. I thought we were very understaffed on the issue of migration,
which is a huge battle within the United Nations, because within the United
Nations the conventional wisdom is that migration is essentially an economic
and political issue and not a human rights issue. I profoundly disagree with
that vision, but the tackling of the migration debate in the United Nations was
always to be based on a win-win situation – that it’s good for the country of
origin and it’s good for the other, and it’s all an economic model which then
conveniently leaves behind those who are a burden to the system, people
who are undocumented or uneducated or sick.
I think to advance a strong human rights discourse on an issue as important
as migration – which I think is one of the most important issues of our time
in terms of the flow of population movements which will be exacerbated by
climate change and scarcity of food and water – it is necessary for the high
commissioner’s office to try to develop that expertise.
There are other areas. The high commissioner for human rights is virtually
absent in the U.N. system on issues of elections. They have become clinical,
technical issues run by elections experts, but democratic rights, the right to
vote, the right to representation – anchoring that in a sophisticated human
rights promotion discourse is really important. The Millennium Development
Goals – it was constantly a battle to inject a human rights framework to the
pursuit of the alleviation of poverty, to make sure that from a human rights
perspective you should always favor those at the bottom first. It’s not just
raising an average, it’s making sure that the most vulnerable, the traditionally
neglected are not the ones again further marginalized. All that is very hard.
So getting into corruption as a deficiency of governments and so on for me
would not have been a priority in human rights circles, just because I thought

34

our plate was so full with things that were much more mainstream and easily
articulated human rights violations for which we were still quite deficient.
DS: Is there any office within the U.N. system that is actually addressing
it? For example, you raise the issue of the Millennium Development
Goals, and in many of these countries, rampant corruption and misuse
of funds from natural resources are in fact some of the reasons that
the Millennium Development Goals are so difficult to attain.
LA: There is the office of drugs and crime, UNODC.
DS: But they aren’t particularly looking at it as a human rights issue.
LA: Are they looking at anything as a human rights issue? UNDP [United
Nations Development Programme] is a massive development program and
has been for years interested in governance. Now in the United Nations the
darling issue has moved from governance to rule of law. Everybody’s in the
rule of law business, even DPKO [Department of Peacekeeping Operations].
I tried to the best of my limited abilities, with virtually no success, to explain
that the blueprint for rule of law is in the human rights instruments. It’s all
there. That’s the kind of legal infrastructure for the promotion of the rule of
law. It’s fundamentally a human rights issue. There’s a lot of money going for
these projects, so there’s a lot of interest.
DS: You mentioned earlier the 60th anniversary of the UDHR. In the 60
years since that was adopted, the human rights movement has often
found itself embroiled in a series of ongoing and persistent debates:
peace versus justice; economic, social and cultural rights versus civil
and political rights; development versus democracy. Given that most
countries have signed on to many of the human rights treaties, with
some famous exceptions such as the United States, what do you make
of the fact that these debates continue decade after decade? Does the
persistence of the debates call into question the universality itself, or
is it just evidence of the persistence of politics?
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LA: Well, all I can say about universality of rights is, if you take currently the
major international human rights instruments, they are pretty comprehensive.
We’re not fully there, but the field is very nicely occupied with instruments
that for the most part are very good. In all my travels, I have yet to meet one
person on earth who if given the chance would voluntarily renounce any of
these rights. When people talk to me about cultural specificity and “you don’t
understand our culture or our religion,” I say, “Well, bring me someone in
your country who doesn’t want to be free from government oppression, who
doesn’t want freedom of speech, freedom of religion, equality.”
I think the universal framework is correct. It probably needs some further
refinements, some further applications, some doctrinal subtleties added to it,
but essentially I’ve never been shown anything profoundly wrong with it. But
there are shortcomings in implementation and there are tensions. The other
issue now that is being manipulated to a point that is sickening is a fabricated
conflict between freedom of expression and freedom of religion. Human
rights is a body of laws and values that feeds itself in the political realm and
vice versa. There’s no better political manipulation than to hijack a human
rights issue and appropriate it. I think to a large extent the false debate
alleging tensions between freedom of expression and freedom of religion is
very much symptomatic of that, that human rights and politics kind of feed
on each other. I think that is what’s always going to be with us.
DS: You may be tired of people asking, but what’s next?
LA: I don’t know. I really don’t know. I will probably do something at some
stage. See, I can’t even answer intelligently half of these questions. I need more
time to think, get some distance. I’m very happy for at least a few more months
of getting an opportunity to travel a bit, speak to students, visit faculties.
DS: Do you have any parting advice for students who may be considering
a career either in international policy and politics or international
human rights?
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LA: It’s very difficult. In my case, things have happened to me so randomly
that it’s difficult to say, do what I did – which is I just sat there and waited
for the phone to ring and something else came up. There was nothing very
deliberate in my own career. But I think in all the work I’ve done, it seems
to me that you have constantly to maintain the right mix of values, passions,
commitment on the one hand and skills on the other. There’s nothing more
dangerous in my view than do-gooders who have very little skill but feel
passionately about issues. At the same time, it’s a pretty short life to be
only a technocrat, particularly in the legal business where there’s so much
promise to do a lot of good with that. So I think particularly those who want
to work on human rights issues and so on, I think you have to nurture your
passionate commitment to it and, unfortunately I hate to say it, you have to
do the hard work also that solicitors have to do on a day-to-day basis if you
really want to make a difference.
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WELCOME AND INTRODUCTION
By Dee Aker
Interim Executive Director
Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice

Good evening. Welcome to the Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice
(IPJ) and the Distinguished Lecture Series at the School of Peace Studies at
the University of San Diego (USD). We’re pleased to have you join us this
evening for an exceptional event. My name is Dee Aker and I’m the interim
director of the Institute for Peace & Justice.
Joining me in welcoming you are Father William Headley, dean of the Joan
B. Kroc School of Peace Studies, Diana Kutlow, senior program officer of our
Distinguished Lecture Series, and our wonderful USD community, including our
newest deans, Mary Boyd from the College of Arts and Sciences and David Pyke
from the School of Business. We are also here with our 2008 Women PeaceMakers
from Bangladesh, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Peru and South Africa.
There are so many people in this audience tonight who deserve recognition;
they’ve come from around the world because this is also the beginning of our
working conference, “Crafting Human Security in an Insecure World.”2
This is also a very special year. This is the year of the 60th anniversary of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and this particular lecture kicks off a
year of looking at the importance of that. Our first speaker is one of the great
human rights and justice advocates of our time, literally of any time.
Human security is much more than a right – it’s a basic requirement for
human development. The Institute for Peace & Justice is electric with the
wisdom and passion both in this room and with what’s coming up to spark
us onward, and we have the right person tonight to integrate security,
development and human rights discussions for us.
						
2 The Distinguished Lecture with Louise Arbour was the opening address for the 2008 Women
PeaceMakers Conference. For more information on the conference and to view the final report,
please see http://www.sandiego.edu/peacestudies/ipj/programs/women_peace_makers/conferences/
CraftingHumanSecurityinanInsecureWorld.php.
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Louise Arbour’s career is one of commitment and action on this front. Hers
is a model for simultaneously humbling and inspiring all of us working in
peacebuilding, and that includes everyone here – our students, our faculty, our
staff and all the people who’ve joined us. Teaching law, leading the Canadian
Civil Liberties Association, she then joined the High Court of Justice, the
Supreme Court of Ontario, just 15 years after receiving a law degree. She moved
on to the Court of Appeals for Ontario in 1990. Many in this audience who are
working for gender justice appreciate the challenge she took on in 1995, when
as president of a commission of inquiry she headed an investigation on the
prison for women in Ontario, exposing the abuses there.
A year later, she became the chief prosecutor of war crimes before the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia. She was recommended by just the right person, none other
than the first chief prosecutor, Justice Richard Goldstone, a member of our IPJ
International Council, whom many of you know from his residency here.3
The Honorable Louise Arbour again showed her mettle when in 1999 she
indicted [Serbian] President Slobodan Milošević – a strong, controversial move
that proved to be exactly right, both as a statement about making people
accountable and also pushing a peace process. A year later she returned to
Canada, newly appointed to the Supreme Court. Following the tragic death of
Sergio Vieira de Mello in 2003, she was appointed as the U.N. High Commissioner
for Human Rights in 2004. She just finished her four-year term.
Once again she has shown the world tenacity and ethical courage and a
commitment to human rights for all. This has not always made her popular.
States and individuals have had their backs up over decisions and statements
exposing those who wanted to be treated with less stringent, less balanced
responses. They protested and grumbled and threatened. Certainly when she
stated that those in positions of command and control could be subject to
personal criminal responsibility for their actions in the Israeli-Lebanon conflict,
						
3 Justice Richard Goldstone was eminent leader-in-residence at the institute in Fall 2005.
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there were some wide, worried eyes. The same was true when she criticized
democracies along with regimes of tyrants. And while it happened far less, about
one out of seven times, some countries we know and love were exposed.
I think that regardless of our country of origin, we know that her assertion that
nobody is safe when leaders who have the capacity to do massive damage
to a population are guaranteed impunity is the reality we must confront
when seeking human security and human rights for all. Louise Arbour is a
determined advocate for the adoption of international human rights standards
and she speaks for many victims around the world. Our distinguished lecturer
is a beacon for peace with justice, to upholding human rights and having
accountability. Please welcome the Honorable Louise Arbour.
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Integrating Security,
Development and
Human Rights

The Honorable Louise Arbour

Thank you very much indeed, ladies and gentlemen. I am truly delighted to
be here and I’m very honored to be invited to deliver this very prestigious
lecture. I should maybe at the outset put a few caveats. As has just been
indicated, I finished my mandate as United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights at the end of June of this year, and I was delighted that for
the first time in my professional life, I was regaining fully my freedom of
expression, both as a judge and as a human rights advocate. I have fought
all my life for the broadest possible scope of freedom of expression, but I’ve
always been working in environments in which by the nature of my work,
my own freedom of expression was somewhat curtailed. So as of the first of
July, I was enchanted to have regained my freedom of expression.
This lecture tonight is one of the very few public engagements I’ve undertaken
since leaving my post. I have to confess to you that despite all this exhilaration,
I can’t really think of anything outrageous to say. I thought I would be saying
enormously outrageous things, but when I look at my prepared remarks they
don’t seem particularly outrageous.
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I should also tell you a little story that was told to me very early in my
academic career and has led me to accept speaking engagements only when
they’re followed by question-and-answer periods, just on the off chance that
I’m a bit off topic. This anecdote will explain to you why I’ve been petrified
most of my professional life about that prospect.
One of my colleagues when I started teaching law was interested in human
rights issues. This is way before the days of easy e-mail communication. He
was contacted by telephone from a very far away country and was invited to
come and speak at a conference. The conference was going to take place in
a totally irresistible location, the Maldives or some exotic place, and he was
very keen to go. The phone connection was not very good, and he said, “Yes,
yes, I’ll come. So, what are you expecting of me?”
And they said, “We’d like you to speak for 20 to 30 minutes on breastfeeding.”
So he thought, well, human rights is a broad topic and the Maldives is a
country I’m very keen to visit. I can do that. So he said, “Yes, all right.”
He was a bit petrified and prepared himself extensively. When he arrived at
the conference, he was told it was a panel and the panelists were introduced.
Then when it came to his turn, the presenter said, “Now, Professor So-and-So
will address you on press freedom.”
I have prepared a few remarks on the general topic of human security. I hope
that I’m on the right page, but if not you’ll just have to bear with me and then
in the question-and-answer period I may get back on topic.
Let me also say that even though I’ve been here essentially just in the course
of today, I already feel very much at home. I’ve been extremely well-received
and I’ve had brief but intense opportunities to meet some of the women
engaged in the Women PeaceMakers Program, some members of the faculty,
and I feel very much at home. I hope this is a beginning of a relationship that
we will be able to pursue in the future.
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I also feel very much at home because you have invited in the past many of
my old friends and colleagues – in fact, I was surprised when I looked at the
list to see so many names of old friends and colleagues, including of course
Mary Robinson, Jan Egeland, Gareth Evans, Lloyd Axworthy, Shirin Ebadi
and, as Dee mentioned, I’m particularly pleased to follow once again in the
footsteps of Richard Goldstone. So let me now turn to my prepared remarks
not on breastfeeding but on human security.
In light of my very recent departure as U.N. High Commissioner for Human
Rights, I seize opportunities like this one to try to distance myself from the
day-to-day operations of that office and reflect in very broad terms about the
effective pursuit of human security, particularly within the U.N. system. So let
me try to clarify one thing at the outset because I find that there is often a lot
of confusion that takes place when we talk about human rights and security.
										

“… it’s important to assert at the outset that security is a
fundamental human right and that the obligation of states to offer
basic security to people under their jurisdiction and control arises
from their obligation to promote and protect the right to life and
security of the person.”
										
Fundamental rights and freedoms are very often described as opposed or
contrary to the pursuit of security interests. For instance, in the law enforcement
world you often hear that human rights impose constraints on the pursuit
of security objectives. In the most outrageous form of that viewpoint it is
argued, for instance, that the prohibition against the use of torture – which as
you know is a fundamental human right that is enshrined in the Convention
against Torture and is a norm of customary international law – stands in the
way of the effective pursuit of security interests.
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Contrary to that position, I think it’s important to assert at the outset that
security is a fundamental human right and that the obligation of states to offer
basic security to people under their jurisdiction and control arises from their
obligation to promote and protect the right to life and security of the person.
So at least when we’re talking about human security, not state security, our
conversation is very much about human rights.
										

“The human rights pillar … is made of glass: fragile, invisible most
of the time, decorative at best, supporting nothing and therefore
requiring only the occasional buffing to make sure that if seen it
would look good.”
										
Let me now turn to the way the United Nations is equipped to support states’
obligations to enhance human security. In 2005, then Secretary-General Kofi
Annan published his report entitled “In Larger Freedom,” which served as
the blueprint for the outcome document of the 2005 World Summit. The
expression “in larger freedom” comes of course from the U.N. Charter and
embraces a vision of human fulfillment predicated on the fundamental ideas
of dignity and equality for all members of the human family.
The secretary-general’s report also asserted, to my great delight as at that
time high commissioner for human rights, that the U.N. architecture rested
on three pillars – security, development and human rights – and that the
three pillars were interlinked. In fact, his words have been quoted very
often. He said, “There can be no security without development. There can
be no development without security. And there can be neither security nor
development without human rights.”
As time went by I became somewhat skeptical of this architectural metaphor
of the three pillars. In fact, as presently constructed, if indeed the United
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Nations rests on three pillars, in my view they are of unequal structural
strength. The security pillar is made of concrete: it’s rough, it’s strong,
suitable for military-type operations. The development pillar is made of
steel: durable, sustainable – to use development lingo. The human rights
pillar in contrast, in my view, is made of glass: fragile, invisible most of
the time, decorative at best, supporting nothing and therefore requiring
only the occasional buffing to make sure that if seen it would look good.
Even though the United Nations has a long history of engagement in security
and development issues, clashes occur frequently among member states about
the proper course of action in these two fields: security and development.
These clashes at times paralyze action in the Security Council or lead to
inconsistent and inefficient fieldwork by a variety of poorly coordinated U.N.
agencies who work broadly speaking on development issues. But nowhere
more than in the field of human rights does the ambivalence of member
states express itself. And this is so in my view for a variety of reasons.
										

“ … despite the assertion in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights that all human rights are universal, interdependent and
indivisible, in reality not all rights are championed with equal
vigor, even by those states like the United States who purport to
embrace a very strong human rights culture.”
										
First and foremost, the comprehensive human rights agenda that is articulated
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the U.N. Charter, leading
human rights treaties and international customary law is a legal and political
framework that imposes internal constraints on what a government can do to
people, in particular to its own people. So not surprisingly, the enforcement
of that framework by international actors, like a high commissioner, is
quickly viewed as an infringement on state sovereignty and an interference
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in the internal affairs of a state. This is particularly so in countries that
very conveniently confuse the interest of the state with the interest of its
current government, which in turn can be easily confused with the interest
of a particular political party or in the most extreme cases with the personal
interests of an entrenched head of state.
Secondly, despite the assertion in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
that all human rights are universal, interdependent and indivisible, in reality not
all rights are championed with equal vigor, even by those states like the United
States who purport to embrace a very strong human rights culture. Economic,
social and cultural rights – the right to health, to food, to education, to shelter –
are not accepted as rights but as mere aspirations to be realized as a byproduct
of a healthy market and decent democracy, in contrast to civil and political rights
which are often promoted by Western countries in a manner that is denounced
as imperialistic and self-serving by poor, developing countries.
										

“… the glass pillar of the U.N. architecture is very much in the
process of trying to reassert itself as a truly indispensible feature
of the legitimate quest for human security.”
										
Finally, there are many more technical reasons flowing from the above. The
nature and evolution of international law from first inter-state law to law
that now reaches persons directly, like human rights law or international
criminal law, has not fully matured. The growth of international and regional
institutions with increasing enforcement capabilities and the globalization of
a culture of rights, moved by an ever-more sophisticated NGO community
operating at the international level – all these are still perceived as an affront
to state sovereignty. In short, the glass pillar of the U.N. architecture is very
much in the process of trying to reassert itself as a truly indispensible feature
of the legitimate quest for human security. And it has much to offer, but
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only if its champions are prepared to acknowledge the necessary linkages
between security and development and embrace a human rights vision that
is truly universal, encompassing all rights equally for all people.
It’s interesting in this context to explore the promise and some of the
shortcomings of the emerging doctrine of responsibility to protect, which I
think is a topic that has been discussed in this institute in the past and is still
very much at the forefront of a lot of international discussions on the issue
of human security.4 As you know, the doctrine was born in the aftermath
of the NATO airstrikes in Kosovo, initially as a product of the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, which introduced the
concept in its 2001 report. Somewhat surprisingly, that doctrine was endorsed
in very specific language – to which I will return – by the General Assembly
in the outcome document of the World Summit in 2005.
						
4 Please see Lloyd Axworthy’s lecture on “The Responsibility to Protect: Prescription for a Global Public
Domain” and Gareth Evans’ “Preventing Mass Atrocities: Making ‘Never Again’ a Reality.” http://www.
sandiego.edu/peacestudies/ipj/programs/distinguished_lecture_series/
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As endorsed in that document, the doctrine views security in a very traditional
framework, which I suggest links it, again, to civil and political rights. Climate
change, the food crisis, natural disasters, global epidemics such as those created
by HIV/AIDS and anticipated by the avian flu – all these are posing security
issues that emphasize in my opinion the importance and the relevance of
economic, social and cultural rights and are not at this stage clearly conceptually
embraced by this emerging doctrine of responsibility to protect.
In a nutshell, that doctrine, as articulated in the outcome document in 2005,
expresses the primary responsibility of states to protect their people “from
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing.” It then
provides, of course, that if states are unable or unwilling to discharge that
responsibility, the responsibility then passes to the international community
which must intervene through a serial process involving prevention, reaction and
rebuilding phases under the authority of the United Nations and, in particular,
of the Security Council, if and when it has to come to coercive action.
I will return to this sequencing feature in a moment, but first let me look briefly
at the scope of the responsibility as stated in that document. In light of its
historical linkage to the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, which posited
an often unwelcomed right to intervene militarily to curtail a humanitarian
catastrophe, the responsibility to protect was carefully articulated to stress
not the right of the prospective intervener, but the responsibility of all states
– primarily of course the state affected – to protect their people and to be
supported in that effort and to be supplemented if they failed.
I am concerned that too much emphasis is being placed on individual state
responsibility, as if to mask the less popular aspect of the doctrine – its
most controversial aspect – that of the collective responsibility of all member
states of the United Nations to take timely, appropriate action, not just to
support a struggling state, but to overtake a defaulting one. Reduced to
the responsibility of states to protect their own people, the doctrine in my
view doesn’t do much except to reconstruct the concept of state sovereignty
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from a protective shield for state action to a bundle of responsibilities and
obligations. But unaccompanied by any form of compulsory enforcement, let
alone sanctions for default, this re-conceptualization doesn’t yield much hope
for improving the plight of those supposedly entitled to state protection.
										

“… the most significant advance in terms of real prospect for real
protection is in the transformation of the right to intervene into
the responsibility to do so.”
										
There is no hiding the fact that the bite of the doctrine is in the collective
responsibility of the international community, acting through the United
Nations, to extend directly their own protective support to those who are
abandoned, or worse are targeted, by their own government. And yet again,
neither the outcome document of the World Summit nor, frankly, the thorough
exposé of the doctrine by the original international commission that looked
at it are very explicit about the nature of that responsibility.
I must say that in my view the most significant advance in terms of real
prospect for real protection is in the transformation of the right to intervene
into the responsibility to do so. I think the language is very significant. I’ve
made this point at length in a lecture I gave last year at Trinity College in
Dublin, but in short, here’s how the argument goes. The right to intervene in
the internal affairs of another state in the face of a humanitarian crisis implies
that the intervening state has a choice to intervene or not. That’s what having
a right means. The exercise of a right is discretionary: One may choose to
intervene or not. And in fact when the intervener chooses to act, it will often
be perceived to coincide with its self-interest. And when it chooses to exercise
its right not to intervene, it will merely be an exercise of a rightful option. And
this of course would apply to the international community as a whole: It could
choose or not to extend a protective hand to people in need. That’s under the
doctrine of humanitarian intervention, the right to intervene.
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“I believe that the responsibility to protect opens a truly new era in
the pursuit of human security.”
										
Under the responsibility to protect doctrine, this is no longer so. There’s no
longer a right, a discretion to intervene, but a responsibility, an obligation to
do so, in certain defined circumstances. Now this is a monumental conceptual
shift, but it’s still lacking in clarity about the exact nature of that responsibility.
Is it merely a moral or a political responsibility? If so, it would still carry a
considerable element of discretion in the sense that the consequences of
failing to meet a mere moral obligation may not be very severe. But what if
we’re talking about a legal obligation? And I believe that the responsibility to
protect opens a truly new era in the pursuit of human security.
There again I think a reality check is necessary. The legal obligation to
prevent genocide is expressly articulated in the Genocide Convention,
which will be 60 years old a day before the anniversary of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights – that is, on December 9 of this year. It’s a norm
of international customary law, but still very few efforts have been made
since it was enacted 60 years ago to endorse it as such.
This brings me to a second aspect of the doctrine of responsibility to protect
as articulated in the 2005 World Summit that I think we need to examine. A
debate emerged relatively early as to whether the responsibility to protect
was couched in terms that were too narrow. As I mentioned to you, it’s
restricted to protection from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity
and ethnic cleansing. Many argue that this was the proper approach if the
doctrine was to have any real application. They claim that to the extent that
it posits a role for the international community to intervene directly in the
internal affairs of the state, the doctrine had to be focused on a restrictive
set of the most egregious threats to life, thereby ensuring its viability and its
relevance as a framework for international action.
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Others questioned whether this narrow focus was not once again a mere reflection
of the Western-style preference for the protection of civil and political rights
over economic and social rights. In many human rights circles, questions were
raised about the responsibility of states to protect their people, their populations
from disease, famine, the effects of natural disasters and of extreme poverty and
deprivation, particularly if those deficiencies were rooted in discrimination. On
what basis was state responsibility, national or international, to be restricted to
what in effect amounted to international crimes, rather than reflect the broad
range of human rights obligations either voluntarily undertaken by states by
treaty or imposed on them by international customary law?
										

“Security can therefore no longer be viewed as either threatened
or ensured principally through the use of force. In that sense, the
Security Council … should no longer be viewed as the sole forum
through which the international community can extend its
protective umbrella to persons in need.”
										
The debate was not only theoretical, as I think was evidenced by the world’s
reaction to the attitude of the government of Myanmar in the aftermath of
Cyclone Nargis. French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, who had been a
very strong proponent of the previous doctrine of humanitarian intervention
– in French, le droit d’ingérence, “the right to interfere” – invoked very early
the responsibility to protect doctrine at the time of the cyclone in Burma
to suggest that the international community had to reach the victims of the
cyclone directly, in the face of the inertia of the Burmese government. In
a classic case of making the theory fit the facts, some who had argued for
giving a limited scope to the emerging doctrine were now arguing that the
non-action of the government of Myanmar could be said to amount to a
form of criminal negligence, thereby making it a crime against humanity that
would then fit squarely within the emerging doctrine as currently articulated.
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I don’t think it’s necessary, frankly, to solve here this doctrinal debate. If
anything it illustrates again the inter-linkages of development, human rights
and security, between freedom from fear and freedom from want. Many of
the conflicts that have flared, in particular in Africa, in the past decade are
rooted in a multitude of human rights deficits and generate the widest variety
of human rights violations. It ranges from arbitrary arrest to forced evictions
to the particular vulnerability of women and marginalized groups everywhere.
Security can therefore no longer be viewed as either threatened or ensured
principally through the use of force. In that sense, the preeminence of the
Security Council, the primus inter pares of international institutions, should
no longer be viewed as the sole forum through which the international
community can extend its protective umbrella to persons in need.
										

“… if we were to apply an intelligent institutional design to
match the different phases of the doctrine – prevention, reaction,
rebuilding – existing institutional candidates emerge and present
shortcomings are readily exposed.”
										
The 2005 outcome document envisages a crucial role for the United Nations
in the application of the responsibility to protect doctrine. In fact, if we were
to apply an intelligent institutional design to match the different phases of the
doctrine – prevention, reaction, rebuilding – existing institutional candidates
emerge and present shortcomings are readily exposed.
First, the Human Rights Council should be the preeminent forum for early
warning and prevention. This new intergovernmental body was mandated by
the General Assembly in 2005, in the same World Summit, to promote universal
respect for the protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.
The council in my view should therefore monitor and respond to both acute
and chronic human rights situations through its regular and special sessions,
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as well as through its new procedure of Universal Periodic Review, under
which the human rights record and performance of all countries, starting with
the council’s own members, will be considered at regular intervals.
Now, this blueprint for action by the Human Rights Council has yet to translate
itself fully into the current reality. As you know the Human Rights Council
was created effectively in 2006, after the demise of its predecessor, the muchmaligned Commission on Human Rights. The Human Rights Council is still a
political body and it behaves very much as such. It consists of 47 member states
of the United Nations, elected by the General Assembly, and the 47 seats are
allocated under the immutable principle of equitable geographic distribution, as
a result of which 26 of the 47 seats are reserved for Africa and Asia.
										

“I would dare suggest that the membership of the United States in the
Human Rights Council would go a long way to enhance the relevance
of the council and could assist in moving it in the right direction.”
										
Although it was contemplated at the time of its creation that states would
compete for a seat on the Human Rights Council and that they would have
to make pledges and commitments as part of their campaign for election,
and although it was hoped that members of the council would vote in their
individual capacity – with their conscience so to speak – in reality the elections
are rarely competitive within each regional group, and the members of the
Human Rights Council tend to vote along group interests. Whether regional
or geopolitical, these interests rarely coincide with the optimum human rights
approach to the issue at hand.
I think for the time being it’s safe to say that we have an institution that could
serve an important prevention and early-warning role in the cases of serious
threats to human security, but the institution that’s mandated to do so has yet to
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live up to its full potential. And I would dare suggest that the membership of the
United States in the Human Rights Council would go a long way to enhance the
relevance of the council and could assist in moving it in the right direction.
Let me turn to the second U.N. institution prominently featured in the
responsibility to protect doctrine. The reaction component of the responsibility
to protect norm fits very squarely within the range of diplomatic, dissuasive
and coercive measures that the Security Council is empowered to deploy,
assuming that the situation has reached the point of constituting a threat to
international peace and security.
Once again there are serious impediments to the Security Council discharging
effectively that function, one of which is of course the existence of the veto
power of the five permanent members of the Security Council. You may
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remember that a major part of the secretary-general’s reform initiative, which
led to this 2005 World Summit document, was the reform of the Security
Council. That part of the secretary-general’s effort was unsuccessful, but it
generated useful ideas about ways to enhance the legitimacy and effectiveness
of the Security Council in the area of human security.
Some of these ideas have been re-articulated very well in a recent article in
Foreign Affairs, the September/October issue, by Morton Abramowitz and
Thomas Pickering. Without going back to the thorny issue of the membership
or composition of the Security Council and the issue of whether or not an
increase in permanent membership should or should not be accompanied
by a veto right, changes could be made without having to amend the U.N.
Charter, simply by developing a consensus among the current permanent
five members about the appropriate use of their veto power. And in the
same way, the authors argue that even a relatively modest contribution
by the permanent five members of the Security Council to peacekeeping
operations, which they currently do not do, would go a long way to enhance
the credibility and effectiveness of peacekeeping operations, particularly in
cases of emergency.
All these discussions, which I think should be encouraged as political solutions,
are more within our reach than formal institutional reform. Here again,
however, a change of culture consistent with our collective responsibility to
respond to humanitarian crises is not on the immediate horizon.
Now, third, there’s a dual set of institutions in the United Nations equipped
to handle the responsibility for different aspects of the rebuilding phase
of the responsibility to protect doctrine. You’ll recall it has a prevention,
reaction and rebuilding phase. The Peacebuilding Commission, another new
institution that the U.N. reform process in 2005 created, has the mandate to
facilitate post-conflict recovery, and it should be ideally suited to identify
the institutional reconstruction and economic development aspects of the
responsibility to protect norm in the longer term.
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“… let me stress that the sequencing of action from prevention to
reaction to rebuilding is much more an intellectual construct than a
likely scenario in reality. The reality of conflict management doesn’t
always lend itself to a convenient, chronological unfolding of responses.”
										
Multilateral justice mechanisms are also available to the international
community to address the punishment component of reconstruction. As the
international commission had noted, a major new element in the international
community’s protection armory is international criminal justice, which has
been and can be activated when domestic systems fail or collapse, through
which perpetrators can be both deterred or/and held to account.
Having said all that, let me stress that the sequencing of action from
prevention to reaction to rebuilding is much more an intellectual construct
than a likely scenario in reality. The reality of conflict management doesn’t
always lend itself to a convenient, chronological unfolding of responses. For
instance, advocates of responsibility to protect often stress correctly that the
doctrine is not only, not even mostly, about military intervention. Much of it
they say is about prevention. Well, this is a very confused response. Military
intervention is a tool expected to be used very much as a last resort, but in
my view, it could be an appropriate tool even in the prevention phase of
the doctrine. For instance, in the face of an impending genocide or crimes
against humanity of some magnitude, everything else failing or being unlikely
to succeed, prevention could require military action.
And in the so-called reaction phase – that is, when the crimes the doctrine
seeks to prevent are actually being committed – the necessity to punish cannot
be pushed back to the reconstruction phase. The call for accountability and
the hope of personal criminal responsibility serving some specific deterrence
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function – all this calls for the earliest possible investigation and prosecution
of war criminals. This of course triggers the unresolved debate about the
alleged conflicting purposes of peace and justice initiatives, and many will
argue that punishment should be deferred always to the reconstruction phase
of the doctrine and should not interfere with the protective reaction efforts.
										

“Whether it will make a much needed contribution to increasing
human security, and therefore to peace and equitable progress,
depends much more on U.N. member states’ political will than
on any further theoretical refinements of the doctrine.”
										
I disagree, as I believe justice serves a protection function, and that in the
sequencing of response to conflict, justice delayed is still justice denied.
Again, it’s unnecessary to resolve this debate here, but it’s important to
understand the breadth of this emerging doctrine and to think it through as
we now seek to operationalize it.
The responsibility to protect norm is part and parcel of a new vision of human
security that the World Summit leaders agreed to in 2005. Whether it will make a
much needed contribution to increasing human security, and therefore to peace
and equitable progress, depends much more on U.N. member states’ political
will than on any further theoretical refinements of the doctrine. But it depends
also on building within the United Nations an institutional infrastructure capable
of effectively implementing the doctrine’s prescriptions. And for that, the full
participation of the United States will be critical not only within the Security
Council, where it occupies with four others a privileged position, but also within
the Human Rights Council, where by choice it occupies currently no seat. And
for the U.S. to make the contribution that it can, should and must make to a
more secure and a more just world, it will have to re-embrace the fundamental
tenets of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
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“… why is the World Food Programme buying food from the
Sudanese government to distribute it to the people of the Sudan?
Doesn’t the government of the Sudan have a direct responsibility
to feed its own people, the international community intervening
only if and when it is unable or unwilling to do so?”
										
On the eve of the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration, the fundamental
concepts of universality and indivisibility of rights may be coming closer in a
world in which security issues are no longer to be associated principally with
the Cold War or the threat of nuclear warfare. The combination of catastrophic
natural disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina or Cyclone Nargis, and the
negligence, ineptitude or worse of governments, has highlighted the dramatic
impact of poverty, discrimination and social exclusion within countries and
between countries. The profound insecurity created by deprivation is at
the heart of the unfulfilled promise of globalization. Even in sophisticated
democratic societies, political play alone is unlikely to offer adequate
redress. The law, and human rights law in particular, offers the blueprint for
an integrated view of human security, guaranteed by individual rights and
collective responsibility, and state as well as individual accountability.
The current shortcomings in the distribution of responsibility between
national states and the international community in my view can be no better
illustrated than was done by Jeffrey Gettleman in the August 10 edition of
the New York Times in an article entitled, “Darfur Withers as Sudan Sells a
Food Bonanza.” The journalist exposes the booming Sudanese food-export
industry, while the country is the recipient of billions of pounds of free
food from international donors and while the World Food Programme, which
often gets donations in cash, cannot meet all its requirements for the Sudan
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by buying food in the country because the government makes more money
exporting it than selling it for domestic consumption.
This, one might say, begs the question, why is the World Food Programme
buying food from the Sudanese government to distribute it to the people of
the Sudan? Doesn’t the government of the Sudan have a direct responsibility
to feed its own people, the international community intervening only if and
when it is unable or unwilling to do so? And why are governments like that of
the Sudan willing to let the international community discharge its obligation
to protect by feeding the people of Darfur, but it’s not willing to let the
international community discharge its broader responsibility to protect the
people of Darfur from rape, killings and displacement?
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The answer might lie in part in the pernicious dichotomy between civil
and political rights and economic and social rights reflected in the World
Summit’s articulation of the doctrine of responsibility to protect. It rests also
on the age-old difficulty of equating in law crimes of omission and crimes of
commission. We may therefore need to articulate with better clarity the basis
on which violations of economic, social and cultural rights may constitute
crimes against humanity. Just as it took very serious jurisprudential efforts to
ensure that rape is properly prosecuted as a crime against humanity and even
in appropriate circumstances as an act of genocide, gross violations of the
right to food, to health, to shelter – whether by direct action or by criminal
negligence – should come to find their proper place within the emerging
doctrine of responsibility to protect.
I would hope that every effort would be made both by international and
domestic prosecutors to fully explore the scope of the law defining crimes
against humanity, so as to give the fullest possible effect of the right to life,
which is the cornerstone of both major international human rights covenants:
the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights. Now, I suggest that this will require a holistic approach
to security, first and foremost emphasizing human security over a nebulous
and convenient claim of national security, and a genuine commitment to the
imperatives of equality and universal entitlement to the protection of the law.
In democratic society, what we ask of our elected governments is that they
design and adjust at all times laws that will ensure the proper balance between
our desire to be safe and our desire to be free. As people and as communities,
we essentially ask ourselves, how much of my freedom am I prepared to
sacrifice to my security? In a perversion of that question, often fueled by
unarticulated political interests, some people who don’t think of themselves
as vulnerable to abuses of power often hear the wrong question. They hear:
How much of the freedom of others am I prepared to sacrifice to enhance my
own security? The answer then is a lot easier, but the result is perverse.
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“The rights of every individual are enhanced, not reduced, by the
enhancement of the rights of others, and conversely, every one of
our fundamental rights and freedoms is diminished by the
curtailment of the rights of others.”
										
This is where enforceable laws must supplement and support democratic
ideals, and this is indeed the genius – in my view – of human rights law. The
rights of every individual are enhanced, not reduced, by the enhancement of
the rights of others, and conversely, every one of our fundamental rights and
freedoms is diminished by the curtailment of the rights of others. Ultimately
both our freedom and our security are best ensured by the enhancement of
the freedom and security of everyone else. In that sense, the imperatives of
indivisibility and universality of rights have real, practical implications, the
most important one being that rights must be enforceable and that they must
be promoted and enforced by law.
As I’ve indicated earlier, whether historically alleged humanitarian interventions
were clearly such or whether they were a mere disguise for the pursuit of
cruder forms of self-interest, they remain a deficient tool for the enforcement
of human rights. Even in dramatic and large-scale threats to the right to life,
humanitarian interventions as we knew them before the articulation of the
doctrine of responsibility to protect put inadequate emphasis on life as an
enforceable right. In the wake of the opinion of the International Court of
Justice in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro, I
think we are witnessing the important fleshing out of the legal obligation to
prevent genocide, while we build on the political commitment to expand that
responsibility to related international crimes.
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Ladies and gentlemen, in conclusion and before I take your questions to get
on topic, I suggest then that a legal landscape is emerging on which peace and
security will be enhanced by the ascendance of an international legal order
that will not supersede the political, but that will further constrain political
action that imperils human security. From the articulation of the doctrine
to the advocacy necessary for a broad-based political endorsement and the
setting up of institutional and operational support, there is a considerable
distance to go, but frankly, the biggest steps have already been taken. They
were taken at least 60 years ago by the framers of the United Nations and by
the framers of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Our task is merely
to give it an air of reality. Thank you very much.

63

Questions and Answers
The audience submitted questions which were read by Dee Aker.

DA: Thank you so much. Given your travels, given your experience
during those four years as human rights commissioner, are you
optimistic or discouraged at this point? Do you find any place where you
see responsibility being assumed in a way that would model a sense of
possibility for us to proceed?
LA: For what it’s worth, and if it’s of any encouragement to anybody, I am
actually optimistic, but maybe it’s just my nature and it’s not based on any
empirical foundation as to why I should be so disposed. First, let me back off
and say that I think that women have a particular take on these kinds of issues.
I think that we are not easily discouraged by the concept that as humans we
have to spend a lot of time just cleaning our immediate environment and that
this is not a sign of defeat. It’s not because we don’t get up every morning to
build the cathedral that we are in a state of regression. A large part of being
human consists of cleaning our nest and making it comfortable for ourselves,
for our families, for our clans, for our broader community. And that is a good
thing; that is in large part just what is expected of us.
So I think you become pessimistic when you set an unrealistic, very high bar
for human accomplishment. To reduce conflict, which statistically we have –
the number of raging conflicts has diminished – to address seriously the gross
inequities that are a stain on our collective conscience, the gross inequities
in the distribution of the wealth of the planet, within countries and between
countries, is something we accomplish very much on a day-to-day basis. If
we make a little progress on any of these issues, I think we have cause to
believe that we’re moving in the right direction.
DA: Let us hope. In the fact that there are democracies as well as these
regimes of tyrants that are now holding up their responsibilities, which is
more distressing to you: to see a democracy not upholding these standards
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or to see that there are these regimes that are so off track? Which is the
greater challenge to us?
LA: Well, again, it depends what it is we’re measuring. If it’s a sense of
personal disappointment and almost betrayal, it’s true that we are hugely
disappointed when we see an erosion, particularly an erosion in norms of
behavior. Frankly, I think what has happened in recent years in the United
States where the government was expressing ambivalence vis a vis the use of
torture, or what amounted to torture, was causing enormous distress in the
human rights community. They felt that if we can’t even maintain the terrain,
the gains that have been made over the past 60 years on agreeing on norms,
how can we possibly, seriously, believe that we will increase our capacity
to enforce these norms? And how can the United States continue to occupy
the strong leadership and advocacy role that it has occupied for such a long
time if it is so easily discredited by those who are just looking for a pretext
not to follow the path?
But at the end of the day I find it very difficult to make comparisons: Are
human rights violations more severe in one country than another? The answer
is probably yes, but I don’t think it particularly helps. For instance, I’ve never
been a great champion of the idea of a kind of ranking of human rights
performance. If we ask ourselves, are human rights more respected today in
Mauritania or in Sweden, I don’t think it’s going to do any good to either the
people of Sweden or Mauritania to answer the question. In my view, the only
relevant question is to ask every state, very clearly, are you today in a state
of regression, stagnation or progress vis a vis your own capacity and your
own history and human rights record? That’s a relevant question, and that’s
a question where I think on that kind of test, it’s quite surprising who would
occupy the first place.
DA: This question is regarding human security. In order to achieve
some of the goals that you presented tonight, do we need a more legal
approach – for example, a strengthening of international criminal
law – or a more political approach – for example, conscience-building,
consensus-building among political actors?
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LA: I like lawyers better than politicians. I firmly believe that there is no universal
point-of-view. We all have a point-of-view. I come from the law. I believe in
the law. I believe that we have not even begun to exploit fully what the law
has to offer in international work. Now, having said that, we can only hope
and pray for the emergence of a more admirable political class. I don’t want to
disparage any politicians anywhere, but I think the law offers us guarantees that
are longer term than the political convenience of the moment. The law leads to
the building of institutions – nothing happens without people, but nothing lasts
without institutions, as the saying goes. If I only had so much energy, I think I
would stay within the promotion of legal instruments.
DA: In line with your newfound freedom of expression, do you believe
that Myanmar, or Burma – in terms of its horrifying tragedy – was a
missed opportunity to assert the requirements of intervention, when
aid and aid workers were continually turned away with the charge
that aid was for another reason? How did you perceive that? What was
supposed to happen with that obligation as a basis of human rights?
LA: I think as the playing field currently exists, both the legal landscape and
the emergence of a political consensus, I don’t think that any kind of forced
foreign intervention was a realistic option, disappointing as it is to say it.
Frankly, I think in that particular climate the best tools were still political
ones, including trying to persuade China to exercise a more proactive role
as an emerging and very important international power force in its own
backyard. And in the case of Myanmar, on certain international initiatives
China may have played a more positive role than it got credit for, possibly
because it wasn’t really seeking any particular credit. But I think in the case
of Myanmar, regional pressure (the ASEAN countries5 were very involved)
and trying to mobilize the potential for the positive role of China was as
much as we could expect at that time.
DA: Do you have any comments, again with this newfound freedom,
to make about the legitimacy regarding the humanitarian issue of
						
5 Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
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Guantánamo Bay, a prison containment center being on foreign soil,
outside the U.S., and not under the same laws apparently as the U.S. in
terms of human rights?
LA: The very first concern that I had about the existence of Guantánamo
Bay to a large extent has been addressed, and that was – both in retrospect
and at the time – the clear intention of the U.S. government to avoid the
judicial oversight that is part of its democratic machinery. There’s more to a
democracy than electoral politics, and I think that we know that the strength
of a great democracy like America is the linkages between the branches of
government, between the legislative, the executive and the judicial branch.
A great distress for me at the time, again coming at it very much from a legal
point-of-view, was this blatant attempt to shelter completely the actions of
the executive from the imperative of judicial oversight.
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This has been addressed in large part through litigation. The courts have
started to re-occupy the place the government was trying to deny them in the
management of one of the most difficult legal, security-related issues of our
time. In that sense, I feel a lot better that the courts are back in the picture
very seriously. It doesn’t mean I’ve agreed with every decision rendered by
the court, but that’s not the point. The point is to have judicial scrutiny.
Now, at the end of the day, I think that Guantánamo, the mere existence of
that institution, has now become a metaphor for American exceptionalism,
double standards, the lack of moral standing that the United States is perceived
to have when it tries to continue its advocacy on human rights issues. So I
think the existence of a facility in which there is, in my opinion, arbitrary,
prolonged detention without much hope that any of these cases will be tried
anywhere, never mind in this country, has caused tremendous damage to the
United States internationally and domestically.
DA: Staying on that political line, what message would you give to a new U.S.
president regarding human rights and the damage that U.S. foreign policy
has done in terms of representation in the international community?
LA: This is very presumptuous of me to start giving advice to an incoming
president. There are many things. If I were asked to do a little prescription
for what the U.S. could do, as I mentioned in my remarks, I think the United
States has to rejoin the international community on the international scene.
So I would hope that we will see the United States compete for election
in the Human Rights Council. It’s inconceivable to have that metaphorical
empty chair. I very much hope that we will see the United States – and that,
frankly, is quite a modest expectation; I don’t think it’s a very big deal. I’m
much more ambitious than that.
I’d like the United States to re-sign the Rome Statute creating the International
Criminal Court. I really believe that American people coalesce around the idea
that tyrants should be taken down, should be made to account, should be
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disempowered. I really believe that that’s a standardly accepted view, but it’s not
possible for the United States to promote that idea while at the same time making
itself unanswerable to foreigners, to the idea that nobody can look at us.
DA: How can private security actors be held accountable – under
whose legal framework?
LA: I have a sense that this will be litigated and we’ll find legal answers to
that. But it would seem to me that it has to be a fundamental principle that
the state cannot abdicate its responsibility by delegating to non-state actors
what is essentially its own responsibility. You cannot privatize warfare and
say that the Geneva Conventions do not apply because the actors are all
non-state actors. I think that the courts will pierce this veil of delegation of
responsibility between the public sector and the private sector in the general
area of the laws of war, and that the responsibility will be revisited back
where it belongs, which is on the state.
DA: Seeing as this is part of a working conference on the role of
women peacemakers, violence against women and security issues,
what is your perspective on the gender dimension? Can you speak a
bit more on the role women are playing?
LA: Well, maybe I’ll just take a little longer on this one, to back up one step.
When I became a member of the judiciary in Canada – well, first of all it was
in the previous century so that’s a long time ago – but it was still at a time
when there were serious questions about the numbers and the considerable
absence of women in the courts. As we started invading the judicial system,
there were lots of interesting discussions on the question, what difference
should it make? If a judge is there to apply the law – you know the image of
the blindfold – what difference should it make if you’re a woman or a man, a
member of the minority group? You’re not supposed to decide a case on the
basis of your personal preference, so why are you so exercised by the idea
that we should have more women on the bench?
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There were lots of debates and discussions and some studies about whether
women judges speak in a different voice. And that debate was somewhat divisive
to a certain extent, even amongst feminists and all those who were promoting
more participation of women in judicial decision making. So there were many
who certainly, based on the work of Carol Gilligan who wrote the book In a
Different Voice, argued that women have a different moral outlook, have a
different sense of moral community. Others were very skeptical and said, even
if women through their upbringing had a different moral outlook, three years
of law school will take away any moral outlook – it’s the great equalizer: You
come out of this, you don’t have any moral views. No, I’m exaggerating.
But the same debate, not as passionately articulated maybe, is simmering on
the question of whether women really have something special to contribute
to the rebuilding of communities, to post-conflict management. And frankly,
without disclosing what position I took on the judicial issue, I really believe
that women worldwide have a unique, very particular relationship to violence
in all its forms. We are collectively the unfortunate recipient of the larger
part of violence in all its forms, including the most invidious, home-based,
family-related violence. So I think women have a particular understanding of
violence in all its forms.
I believe women have also a particular take on the resolution of disputes.
Again, there are lots of debates as to whether women are better at seeking
a consensus. But at the end of the day it’s a matter of right. We have a right
to participate in our own governments and we have to build institutions
domestically and internationally that are the mirror of the communities
in which we work. That’s what diversity is about, including I think the
participation of adult women in their own governance, including in the
reconstruction of a country and the search for peace.
DA: When we think about the fact the U.S. is 69th in the percentage of women
serving in government, and we look at a place like Rwanda, which went
through this incredible crisis, which now has a majority of women running
the government, what happens in that process? Do we have to go through
some kind of violent experience to step to the plate to take action?
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LA: I certainly hope not. But frankly, the old-fashioned, liberal, Western
democracies don’t look particularly good. I don’t have the statistics on
the question of participation in governance, but there are lots of younger
democracies – and maybe because they came in to structure it themselves in
this century – that have no difficulty imposing quotas for the participation
of women in their legislative branch. We have to be careful with that. In
Afghanistan, for instance, they have seats secured for women, but it’s very
dangerous to have women basically being just the proxies of other interests.
So it’s not a fully guaranteed system. But participation in governace is very
much the contribution of the new world, of emerging democracies. On
that front and many others, we, the more traditionally established Western
countries, do have a few lessons to learn.
DA: What is the United Nations doing to push the U.S. to ratify the
women’s human rights treaty signed by most other countries: CEDAW,
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women? Is there any pressure?
LA: It’s not just the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women. The United States is not a big ratifier of treaties, particularly of
human rights treaties. That’s the reality. It has an extremely low ratification rate. The
usual answer is, well, we don’t need to ratify because we’re already in compliance.
I hear that one not just in the U.S. but in many countries that will not ratify.
This is a debate that I think has to take place within this country. What is
the United Nations going to say to persuade the American government to
embark on a series of treaty ratifications? Why isn’t the U.S. ratifying the new
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities? Why? I think this is a
quintessential American debate. It has to take place in this country. It’s part
of joining the international community. It’s part of rejecting any sense of
exceptionalism that we’re different.
In many ways, particularly when it comes to military action, I think it’s
important to recognize that the United States has a very unique exposure.
It’s called to action much more than anybody else. It’s very exposed. But it
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doesn’t mean that it has to withdraw completely from the mechanisms that all
others have to embrace, whether on racial discrimination, on discrimination
against women, on persons with disabilities, the Convention on the Rights of
the Child. The United States has still not ratified the Convention on the Rights
of the Child. How can that be? Along with what now, Somalia?
DA: Assuming that Vice President Dick Cheney or former Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld traveled abroad and are detained for crimes
against humanity, would you take on the difficult task of defending
them, if offered?
LA: I thought the question was going to be, would you prosecute? But I have
to say, defending has a certain attraction. First of all, it’s just about the only
job I’ve never had in the realm of international criminal justice and compared
to prosecuting it tends to pay better. But I don’t think it’s likely that my
services would be retained in that capacity.
DA: Can you say something about the rights of immigrants, the global
phenomenon of people being pressed across borders, the internally
and externally displaced?
LA: I think that the question of immigration is probably one of the most
challenging for the entire world and, unfortunately, we tend to see it with
very narrow geographic lenses. The word immigration on this continent,
particularly in this country, evokes a particular flow of persons for particular
reasons. But in Indonesia, for instance, there is an exodus of domestic
workers to the Gulf countries. So the question of the movement of people,
particularly for economic reasons, is a worldwide phenomenon that in my
view is not being addressed sufficiently in human rights terms. It’s being
addressed, certainly in a U.N. forum, always as an economic and a political
issue – but mostly as an economic issue, where the message is supposed to
be that it’s a win-win situation: It’s good for the country of origin, remittances,
it’s good for the countries who have shortages of workforce. But I think we
haven’t really seriously addressed it as a human rights issue.
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For instance, and this is not just the United States, there’s not a single Western
country that has ratified the Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers and
Members of Their Families. Now, how can the Western world lecture developing
countries about their human rights obligations when it is not prepared to take
on the responsibilities in the few areas that really hurt them, that are hard to
sell to their populations, that are sometimes unpopular issues?
On questions of migration, racism, all of a sudden you see a retrenchment
by Western countries – by Europe, by North America – and I think it has to
be looked at in human rights terms, including the fact that undocumented,
illegal immigrants have rights. They may not have the full-fledged rights that
come with citizenship in the same way that landed immigrants or immigrants
who are in a country irregularly may have, or the same full-fledged series of
entitlements that come from nationality and citizenship, but they have some
rights. They have the right to life. Is anyone suggesting that we should kill
them all? But this refusal to look at the position of people who are outside
their country of nationality or origin as rights holders is not acceptable.
DA: In Uganda the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) victimizes its subjects
and yet the leaders of the rebellion fear to come to an agreement due
to fear of the International Criminal Court and the potential for their
arrest now. And so, the subjects on whom the Lord’s Resistance Army
prey are still victimized. How can the Human Rights Council help or
how can something change this case?
LA: On that I would question the premise of the question, which is that the
leaders of the LRA refuse to negotiate a ceasefire or a longer term peace
agreement because they’re afraid of the International Criminal Court. Where
have they been in the last 20 years? They weren’t at the table, and there were
no indictments against them. In fact, I think the ICC withheld for some time
its indictments in the hope that the peace process would advance. So, frankly,
one has to ask, is this just a pretext for not making a deal that they don’t want
to make in the first place or is this a genuine concern? And if it is a genuine
concern, well, there are not a lot of options. The option that they would like
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doesn’t exist anymore, which is not to be held accountable for anything. That
one is no longer feasible. So if what they’re saying is that they would rather
be tried for crimes against humanity in Uganda, that is an option. It’s not one
that’s up to them; it’s up to the ICC. So there are options. But the one that they
would like, which is never to have to account for their 20-year murderous
rampage, fortunately that one is not an option anymore – thank God.
DA: What can young people do to make human rights a fundamental
pillar of the United Nations and the international community?
LA: There are times when I wonder how challenging this must all look,
because young people today are confronted with so much more information
and so many at least theoretical options, but how to materialize these options
in reality is a little more difficult. I think we can’t be of every good fight.
There are times when I look at what I’ve done and I think, I feel very
badly because I’ve never been seriously engaged on issues related to the
environment. Well, that’s true, but I was really busy. You can’t let yourself
feel inadequate because you can’t save the planet in all its aspects.
I think you have to pick your fights and really commit. Then you have to
show solidarity with the others who are picking the other good fights. You
have to be a good citizen; there’s an obligation to inform yourself. But as to
what kind of work plan you should have, I can’t say. I can’t even figure out
how young people figure out what these options are for them.
Again, as a general position I’d say: Pick one. Don’t feel badly you can’t do
them all. Make sure that others do them all, particularly your elected leaders.
Believe in solidarity. You have to belong to a group that is moving with you
toward this better world.
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